The battle for Cassinga : conflicting narratives and contested meanings by Baines, Gary F, 1955-
The Battle for Cassinga: Conflicting Narratives and Contested Meanings 
 
Gary Baines1
 
 
Introduction 
Nearly thirty years ago the name Cassinga (or Kassinga) came to the attention of the 
world. At the time the name evoked a range of responses, from outrage to grief to the 
celebration of military bravado. It still does so. And Cassinga will continue to elicit 
such responses as long as participants and witnesses are alive and the events remain 
part of living memory. Obviously perpetrators and survivors remember the events of 4 
May 1978 differently. Memory is, after all, selective. The recollections of participants 
and witnesses are framed by personal and political agendas. This much is abundantly 
clear from the conflicting accounts of Cassinga that appear in the media and literature, 
especially the exchanges that take place between parties with a stake in how the 
events are remembered. Thus a report headlined “Battle of Cassinga still rages” 
published on the 29th anniversary suggested that the events are still shrouded in 
controversy and that there is no agreement about what transpired in the southern 
Angolan town.2  
The title of this paper reflects my concern with the battle for rather than of Cassinga. 
The choice of preposition is intended to signify the ongoing contestation over the 
meaning of Cassinga. The name ‘Cassinga’ is a floating signifier (in the Barthesian 
sense) that attaches itself to a chain of meanings. Meanings are partly determined by 
other words with which it is associated. So when Cassinga is used in conjunction with 
‘battle’ as in the ‘battle of Cassinga’, it suggests an engagement between two armed 
forces although war had not actually been declared. This phrase is usually employed 
in accounts that amount to apologia for South African Defence Force (SADF) actions. 
Other military terms that are frequently used in conjunction with Cassinga include 
‘assault’, ‘attack’ and ‘raid’. Such terms imply that Operation Reindeer was a military 
                                                 
1 My thanks to Dag Henrichsen, my host at the Basler Afika Bibliographien (BAB), as well as to the 
National Research Foundation and the Rhodes University Joint Research Committee for funding the 
research trip to the BAB. The opinions expressed here are entirely my own but certain arguments have 
been informed by a discussion that followed the presentation of an earlier version of this paper at the 
BAB, 11 December 2007. 
2 The Star, 19 May 2007 (‘The battle of Cassinga still rages’) 
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=vn20070519093038473C345664 
(accessed 28 Sept. 2007). 
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strike on an enemy base and, as such, an act of warfare. The use of these terms 
implies no moral judgment of SADF actions because (so the argument goes) in a war 
situation it is not always possible to distinguish between civilians and combatants, and 
civilian casualties are regarded as an unfortunate but unavoidable by-product of 
military operations – what the Americans euphemistically call ‘collateral damage’. On 
the other hand, Cassinga is invariably coupled with ‘massacre’ by the South West 
Africa Peoples’ Organisation (SWAPO) and its supporters. This term implies the 
purposeful killing of innocent civilians, especially defenceless women and children. 
As such, it resonates with the atrocities of other wars; with well-known names such as 
Guernica, Nanking and My Lai.3
 
This paper will examine the ways in which the events of 4 May 1978 have come to be 
narrated. Narratives would seem to imply the use of words but frequently employ 
images to convey their meanings. They are generated in order to explain, rationalise, 
and define events. In the case of Cassinga, conflicting narratives have been 
constructed by SADF apologists and SWAPO supporters. Veterans of the ‘battle’ 
have a vested interest in preserving the myth that it was a daring exploit without 
parallel in the annals of South African military history whereas survivors of the 
‘massacre’ have adopted SWAPO’s narrative that holds that the deaths of those in the 
camp was a necessary sacrifice for the making of the new nation of Namibia. 
Members of these opposing interest groups have attempted to appropriate Cassinga 
for their own purposes. This contestation over the meaning and memory amounts to a 
battle for Cassinga. The struggle to fix the meaning of Cassinga extends into the 
(overlapping) arenas of political discourse, popular culture, and scholarly debate. It is 
what the Americans like to call a ‘culture war’4 in which different interpretative 
communities construe the meaning of the episode from conflicting vantage points. 
 
                                                 
3 I plan to explore the My Lai analogy elsewhere, although it seems to me that a more accurate parallel 
might be the 1976 Chimoio massacre committed by the Rhodesian Special Air Service and Selous 
Scouts when they attacked a refugee camp in Mozambique. See Focus: News Bulletin of the 
International Aid & Defence Fund, No. 6 September 1976 (‘Refugees Massacred by Smith’s Troops’). 
The photograph of a mass grave reproduced on p. 11 bares a remarkable resemblance to the Cassinga 
massacre images referred to below. Other sources sympathetic to the Smith regime suggest that the 
attack was the work of the Rhodesian Light Infantry and that they targeted a base of ZANLA guerrillas. 
4 The classic example is the Enola Gay controversy about which there is a voluminous literature. 
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 SADF Apologist Accounts 
There is no official history of Cassinga but accounts by Willem Steenkamp amount to 
a semi-official or SADF-sanctioned chronicle. A former Cape Times military 
correspondent, sometime national serviceman and citizen force reservist, Steenkamp 
glamourises the Cassinga story as an exceptional military endeavour.5 He is effusive 
in his praise for the SADF’s military prowess in staging a large-scale operation 
requiring precise planning, logistics and timing. The point of departure for his 
versions of Operation Reindeer is to insist that Cassinga was a legitimate military 
target. Steenkamp accepts at face value the Vorster government’s claim that Cassinga 
was a military training base rather than a civilian centre for transient refugees and 
that, as such, an important HQ from where PLAN commander Dimo Hamaambo 
planned infiltration routes into Namibia. Writers such as Steenkamp revel in 
descriptions of the military hardware and the skills of the paratroopers. According to 
him, the operation achieved pride of place in the annals of SADF military history and 
restored its reputation after the abortive invasion of Angola in 1975. South African 
media and white public opinion proclaimed the operation a daring military adventure 
in which the SADF modus operandi exemplified its far-sighted leadership, discipline 
and training, and above all the capacity to protect the country from its enemies 
 
Former SADF personnel tell the Cassinga story as if it were an unqualified success. 
Major-General Jannie Geldenhuys, then Officer Commanding South West Africa, has 
referred to Operation Reindeer as a “jewel of military expertise.”6  An anonymous 
entry in Wikipedia displays insider knowledge of SADF planning and obvious 
familiarity with Operation Reindeer, and it can be safely deduced that this piece is the 
work of a SADF paratrooper.7 It proclaims the result of the Battle of Cassinga a 
“decisive victory for South Africa”. The outcome is measured by means of a body 
count in the ratio of 4: over 600. These casualty figures suggest a one-sided/unequal 
engagement notwithstanding the surprise element – which is overstated because the 
                                                 
5 Willem Steenkamp, Borderstrike! South Africa into Angola (Durban: Butterworths Publishers, 1983), 
15-141. 
6 Jannie Geldenhuys, A Generals’ Story: from an era of war and peace (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 
1993), p. 72. 
7 ‘Battle of Cassinga’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/battle_of_Cassinga (accessed 18 Sept. 2007). 
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ground attack took over an hour to materialise following the off-target drop. This 
version holds that most of casualties were caused by the bombing and strafing of the 
camp rather than the ground fighting. After landing and regrouping, the paratroopers 
conducted a ‘mop-up’ operation that included eliminating the spirited resistance posed 
by PLAN cadres staffing anti-aircraft guns,8 and fighting a rearguard action against 
Cuban-FAPLA reinforcements from Techamutete. The stress on regular military 
engagements and acknowledgment of the bravery of the SWAPO and Cuban soldiers 
directs attention away from the civilian casualties. Such accounts effectively efface 
the loss of civilian life by emphasising that Cassinga was a battle that was waged by 
two armed forces, for no mention is made of SADF soldiers systematically rounding 
up and killing all those who had not managed to flee the camp before their arrival.9  
British academic Edward George points out that South African paratroopers recall 
Cassinga as a military action not a massacre and that there has never been any 
admission of culpability in the wanton murder of women and children.10 This is not 
entirely true for at least one SADF soldier has confessed to having to carry out orders 
to summarily execute wounded survivors of the operation. And at the TRC conscript 
hearings, a witness confessed to being haunted by the memories of what happened at 
Cassinga.11 Athough he declined to elaborate on what he had witnessed or 
participated on the fateful day, his statement hints at the unwillingness of the SADF to 
treat captured cadres and non-combatants as POWs. Former generals insist that they 
observed the rules of engagement despite not officially being at war with SWAPO 
and that the SADF’s code of conduct was strictly enforced in the ranks. However, 
South Africa did not ratify the 1977 amendment to the Geneva Protocol that accorded 
captured ‘freedom fighters’ the status of POWs. There were undoubtedly abuses such 
as the torture of those identified as ‘terrorists’. Whilst no accusations or reports of the 
                                                 
8 Visual and anecdotal evidence suggests that the AA guns were incapacitated by the initial SAAF 
bombing of the camp and that PLAN cadres never used them against SADF troops on the ground. 
9 See, for example, Morgan Norval, Death in the Desert: The Namibian Tragedy (Washington: Selous 
Foundation Press, 1983), ch. 13. 
10 Edward George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: from Che Guevera to Cuito 
Cuanavale (London: Frank Cass, 2005), p. 135. 
11 TRC Report, V. 2, p. 44. Lt. Johan Frederich Verster, a member of the SADF’s special forces, 
characterised the attack as “probably the most bloody exercise that we ever launched. We were 
parachuted into the target. It was a terrible thing. I saw many things that happened there but I don’t 
want to talk about it now because I always start crying. It’s damaged my life.” This self-pitying 
statement seeks to transform the perpetrator into a victim. 
 4
rape and torture by the SADF at Cassinga itself have surfaced,12 a code of silence 
undoubtedly prevails amongst these former comrades in arms. These two isolated 
instances may be interpreted as confessions and may even represent the proverbial tip 
of the iceberg. But they have not been verified by other sources.  
Apologists for the SADF are also to be found amongst conservative historians. Leo 
Barnard of the History Department at the University of the Free State has published a 
number of articles on Cassinga.13 Barnard is distrustful of SWAPO accounts because 
they make no mention of military installations such as anti-aircraft guns and trenches, 
and the presence of SWAPO’s armed combatants. He is more inclined to believe 
SADF accounts that relate the stiff resistance encountered by SADF troops from 
SWAPO cadres, especially by those manning the AA guns. This, of course, gives 
credence to the SADF version that they did not simply attack a refugee camp but 
encountered trained soldiers who fought bravely in the face of great odds. This 
reasoning has also been employed to explain why the operation overran its schedule 
by some hours. But other factors also played a part in prolonging the operation: the 
paratroopers missed the drop zone and lost at least an hour regrouping, and had to 
improvise a RV; a rearguard action was needed to see off Cuban/FAPLA armoured 
cars and tanks; moreover the helicopters were incapable of evacuating all the 
paratroopers at once. Barnard is rightly suspicious of Cuban accounts that dismissed 
their engagement with SADF forces at Cassinga and denied that they had sustained 
any losses. Piero Gleijeses’ recent work has served to confirm that this was indeed the 
case.14 But Barnard’s defence of the SADF version of Cassinga actually rests on his 
naïve invocation of ‘scientific objectivity’. When he argues that articles such as his 
                                                 
12 Prisoners were taken as a result of the simultaneous ground assaults on Chetaquera and Dombondola 
that comprised part of the three-pronged Operation Reindeer. Many of these prisoners were reportedly 
subjected to torture and maiming during lengthy incarceration. There were also reports of the bodies of 
victims being dropped from helicopters. Although removed from camps closer to the Namibian-
Angolan border, the so-called ‘Kassinga detainees’ became a cause celebre. See IDAF Focus 23 July-
August 1978, p. 16 (‘Cassinga Raid’), IDAF Focus 28, May-June 1980, p. 10 (‘Kassinga Detainees’), 
IDAF Focus 29, July-August 1980, p. 8 (‘Detainees Visited’). 
13 Leo Barnard, Die Gebeurte by Cassinga, 4 Mei 1978 – ‘n Gevallestudie van die Probleme van ‘n 
Militêre Historikus’, Historia (May 1996), 88-99; ‘The Battle of Cassinga, 4 May 1978: A historical 
reassessment Part 1: The course of the battle and ensuing controversy’, Journal for Contemporary 
History, 31, 3 (December 2006), 131-146; ‘The Battle of Cassinga, 4 May 1978: A historical 
reassessment Part 2: Interviews with two SADF soldiers’, Journal for Contemporary History, 31, 3 
(December 2006), 147-160. 
14 Piero Gleijeses, ‘The Masscre of Cassinga’, 
http://amadlandawonye.wikispaces.com/The+Massacre+of+Cassinga,+Piero+Gleijeses (accessed 26 
November 2007). 
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own are “based on highly academic reasoning with full reference to the sources used” 
by practitioners who have conducted years of research on the subject then the reader 
is supposed to accept that specialist knowledge qualifies them to provide a definitive 
account of events. And when Barnard asks readers to accept that the “personal 
experience of people who were involved in the war effort” provides such accounts 
with the authenticity accorded by first-hand knowledge then they are supposed to 
accept this formulation at face value. But these assumptions are flawed and have been 
thoroughly discredited. There is now widespread recognition in the profession that 
historical knowledge is constructed and that neither expertise nor closeness to the 
events necessarily guarantees an authoritative account of the past. Barnard’s own 
credibility can be no more vouchsafed than accounts by SWAPO or Cuban narrators. 
McGill Alexander is a former paratrooper in the SADF and retired from the SANDF. 
It is arguable whether his MA thesis amounts to an apology or justification for what 
he prefers to call the Cassinga ‘raid’. His work is the most comprehensive 
examination of Operation Reindeer to date. While claiming to focus on strategic and 
tactical aspects of the military operation, he finds it impossible to disengage from the 
controversy that followed the action. He notes numerous inconsistencies in the 
standard SWAPO version that was disseminated by the international media. However, 
his effort to achieve balance is undermined by a failure to locate and interview 
survivors, as well as an inability to secure the cooperation of SWAPO military 
personnel to answer his queries. On the other hand, Alexander had access to 
declassified SADF documents that accord him privileged insight into the workings of 
Military Intelligence and logistical planning of the operation. Yet, he points out 
certain anomalies in the received version and is occasionally critical of SADF 
conduct. Consequently, he has been taken to task by at least one participant in the 
Cassinga drop for casting aspersions on the professionalism and integrity of members 
of the SADF’s elite fighting force. Retired SADF captain, Tommy Lambrechts, has 
effectively accused Alexander of betraying his fellow parabats.15 He is taken to task 
for having broken ranks with the SADF and questioned its version of Cassinga that 
minimises the killing of civilians. Lambrechts reckons that SWAPO was responsible 
for using civilians as human shields; an argument that inverts the prime purpose that 
Cassinga served as a transient refugee camp and had but a token defensive capacity. 
                                                 
15 Tommy Lambrechts reply to McGill Alexander on Cassinga, 4 June 2007. 
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Many veterans continue to believe that the SADF was somehow above politics and 
beyond reproach for its conduct. And South Africa’s security establishment have 
clung to the view that the maintenance of white supremacy hinged on an arrogant 
display of chutzpah, as is the case with Israel’s military in its wars against the 
Palestinians and neighbouring Arab nations, 
 
SWAPO and Sympathiser Accounts 
SWAPO propaganda made every effort to place the Cassinga massacre on a par with 
other war crimes or “atrocities”. Statements released by SWAPO spokespersons 
accused the SADF of the “cold-blooded murder of innocent and unarmed refugees”; 
“of massacring the terror stricken population in cold blood”, and so on. The refrain 
focused on the children, women and the elderly who were victims of the SADF attack. 
A narrative coalesced around tropes of the innocence and defencelessness of the 
Cassinga casualties; of martyrs of the Namibian nation in the making. 
 
Validation of the liberation movement’s version of the massacre was provided by the 
visit of international journalists to Cassinga. On 8 May, they were confronted by the 
horrific sight of the carnage caused by the SADF attack. Two mass graves – one 
covered up and apparently containing the bodies of 122 children and the other an open 
trench in which 582 victims were awaiting burial – provided evidence of the scale of 
the massacre. The party of journalists included Gaetano Pagano who photographed 
the open mass grave. The images of corpses, some of whom are women, some young, 
and some wearing civilian clothing are evident to a cursory examination of the 
photographs. The most widely disseminated photograph [Figure 1] is a black and 
white print showing the body of a woman in a dress prominently visible in the 
foreground and lying on top of a pile of bodies.16 It was widely syndicated and 
published by newspapers such as Basler Zeitung under the caption “Ein Dokument 
des Grauens”.17 In June SWAPO issued its eponymous bulletin with the same image 
appearing on the cover with the byline “Massacre at Kassinga: climax of Pretoria’s 
                                                 
16 This image appears in Pagiano’s publication The Kassinga File but the East German news agency, 
AND, claimed that it had been taken by one of their photographers. See McGill Alexander, ‘The 
Cassinga Raid’, p. 170. 
17 BAB, A.A3, Swapo Collection, 78aSPR2, 16 May 1978. 
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all-out campaign against the Namibian resistance”.18 The picture was included in the 
Kassinga File, a collection of images compiled by Pagano and Swedish filmmaker 
Sven Asberg.19 The file was distributed to the network of agencies and organisations 
affiliated to the international anti-apartheid movement. These organisations 
distributed and displayed the images of the mass grave at public exhibitions and in 
publications. The shot became emblematic of the Cassinga massacre.  
 
 
Fig. 1 Mass grave, Cassinga (Pagano) 
 
It was also reproduced on a number of posters commemorating Kassinga Day 
produced by solidarity organisations such as the International University Exchange 
Fund (IUEF) and SWAPO’s own Department of Information and Publicity. Figure 2 
entitled ‘Massacre at Kassinga’ must have been produced fairly soon after the 
events.20  It comprises a montage that foregrounds three colour images presumably of 
                                                 
18 BAB, A.A3, Swapo Collection, 78fSLkPb1, Special Bulletin of SWAPO, Lusaka (Luanda?), June 
1978. 
19 Published and produced by the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF), an NGO that had 
provided assistance to Namibian refugees and SWAPO since 1963. See BAB, Swapo Collection, 
78aSpb7, The Kassinga File. 
20 BAB Poster Collection, X 445 ‘Massacre at Kassinga’ which is part of the Kassinga File 
photographic exhibition dd. 1978. 
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survivors and victims of the massacre. These include the Pagano photograph of the 
mass grave, overlaid on black and white images reproduced from the SADF magazine 
Paratus. The superimposition of the colour images of Cassinga victims and survivors 
over the black and white images of text and South African soldiers seeks to focus the 
viewer’s attention on the tragedy of lives deemed expendable by the South African 
soldiers who participated in the operation. The poster also seems to suggest that the 
SWAPO version of events with its human interest represents truth whereas the SADF 
version amounts to a tissue of lies. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Massacre at Kassinga (Pagano/Asberg) 
 
On the strength of the imagery of Cassinga circulating in the public realm or what he 
has been able to access in archives, McGill Alexander argues that the available visual 
evidence does not seem to support the contention that “photographs and videos of the 
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mass graves at Cassinga show almost exclusively corpses of women and children”.21 
This might be so. But it is hardly the point. For in the propaganda war it is perception 
rather than reality that matters. And public perceptions of Cassinga were shaped not 
by the referential but the symbolic value of the mass graves imagery. The graphic 
nature of the subject matter meant that it resonated with the imagery of mass killing 
associated with genocides such as the Holocaust. The horrendous sight of a trench or 
pit full of grotesquely twisted bodies in a state of rigor mortis is reminiscent of the 
images of death camps such as Belsen and Dachau after their liberation by the Allies 
in 1945. Images of piles of corpses – whether or not women and children were visible 
– conjured up atrocities such as My Lai in the public mind. It was arguably this 
picture that “had a marked effect on public opinion in Western countries” and turned 
Cassinga into a propaganda coup for SWAPO. And its widespread dissemination 
demonstrated that Cassinga was synonomous with the murder of innocent victims. 
 
The Cassinga issue has remained sensitive in post-independent Namibia with SWAPO 
particularly keen on ensuring that its version of events enjoys primacy. A study 
published in 1994 under the auspices of the Namibian National Archives uses the 
ostensibly neutral term ‘event’ rather than ‘massacre’ in relation to Cassinga.22 
Annemarie Heywood’s language is more restrained in its treatment of the topic than 
most previous academic publications written by SWAPO sympathisers.23 She 
studiously seeks to avoid being regarded as biased or partial by following tried and 
tested methods of primary research. But her interrogation of extant evidence simply 
confirms the findings of previous investigations that SWAPO’s version is, for the 
most part, incontrovertible. What Heywood’s work really lacks, though, is an 
appreciation of what Cassinga has come to mean for Namibia’s narrative of 
nationhood; that for SWAPO its symbolism far outweighs the importance of the 
historical project committed to the quest for the ‘full and sober truth’. The liberation 
movement is seeking to establish its legitimacy as the government of post-colonial 
                                                 
21 McGill Alexander, ‘The Cassinga Raid’, p. 170 note # 832. 
22 Annemarie Heywood, The Cassinga Event: an investigation of the records (Windhoek: National 
Archives of Namibia, 1994). Christopher Saunders has criticised Heywood for misinterpreting the 
significance of the raid for the implementation of a Namibian settlement. See Southern African Review 
of Books, Sept/Oct. 1994. 
23 See, for instance, D. Herbstein & J. Evenson, The Devils are Among Us: The War for Namibia 
(London: Zed, 1989) who are unequivocal in condemning Cassinga as the “bloodiest massacre of the 
war”. 
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Namibia. Having been accorded recognition as the ‘sole and authentic representative 
of the Namibian people’ by the UN General Assembly during the days of the war of 
national liberation, SWAPO now has to justify its right to rule by appealing to its 
struggle record. 
 
The SWAPO government in post-independent Namibia has sought to prevent counter-
narratives of the Cassinga massacre finding a ready audience. As late as 1995 
SWAPO still deemed it necessary to counter what  (then President) Sam Nujoma 
described as the enemy’s “disinformation campaign aimed at convincing world public 
opinion that Cassinga served as PLAN’s military headquarters and that the victims 
were armed combatants”.24 This statement appeared in a foreword to a booklet with a 
cover portrait that shows Nujoma holding a child, purportedly an orphan and one of 
the survivors of the massacre. Nujoma describes the refugees as a “soft target” and 
indicts the racist South African colonial army for its indiscriminate killing of women 
and children. The body of the text was co-authored by a Namibian journalist and a 
Swedish political scientist, the latter having served on the UNHCR/WHO delegation 
that had visited the Cassinga site shortly after the attack. The “untold story” of the 
sub-title presumably refers to the voices of the survivors; to the testimonies of 16 
victims of the massacre. Although the booklet’s blurb makes much of the fact that the 
stories are first-hand accounts of the survivors’ experiences, they give the impression 
of being well-rehearsed versions that reiterate certain themes such as the brutality of 
the SADF soldiers who bayoneted and shot wounded refugees at close range. The 
survivors are meant to constitute a representative sample of victims similar to John 
Hersey’s hibakusha who suffered as a result of the US atomic bombing of Hiroshima. 
It is noteworthy that they all belong to a generation of political activists who owe their 
education and job security to SWAPO. Indeed, Cassinga survivors (whose numbers 
seem to increase with the passage of time) have undergone a subtle shift of roles: 
from the embodiment of victimhood to sacrifice. 
 
The Controversy Continues 
Following independence, SWAPO proclaimed Kassinga Day a public holiday and 
Namibians were implored to ‘Remember Kassinga’. Victims came to epitomise 
                                                 
24 Foreword to Mvula ya Nangolo & Tor Sellström, Kassinga: A Story Untold (Windhoek: Namibia 
Book Development Council, 2005), p. vi. 
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martyrs of the liberation struggle and survivors the sacrifices necessary to build a new 
nation. Indeed, Cassinga has become part of the founding myth of the Namibian 
nation. Not much space exists for alternative versions of the Cassinga story in 
Namibian public discourse as SWAPO exercises extensive sway over the media and – 
unlike the detainees death in detention camps issue – there are no pressure groups 
speaking out against an external enemy that ceased to pose a threat. But outside of the 
country SWAPO cannot prevent the appropriation of Cassinga for altogether different 
political purposes. For instance, SADF paratroopers celebrated the accomplishment of 
the Cassinga raid until 1996 when the ANC government put paid to that practice.25 
Although the ANC felt obliged to apologise for the conduct of SANDF soldiers, the 
South African ruling party does not have quite the same vested interest as SWAPO in 
establishing a master narrative of the Namibian war of liberation. The solidarity 
between the (former) liberation movements does not necessarily extend to 
constructing a shared version of the past. 
McGill Alexander reckons that South Africa won the military battle for Cassinga but 
lost the propaganda war. He laments the way in which the liberation movements have 
come to exercise a monopoly on the Cassinga story. He holds that: 
  The victors of the liberation struggle, whose refrain is now the official voice, 
appear to have triumphed in their version of events. Those who espouse the 
SADF version are largely seen as discredited adherents of a regime based on 
lies.26
McGill Alexander’s assertion requires some qualification. It is presumably based on 
the adage that says winners write the history books. In fact, the struggle over who gets 
to rewrite history is far more complicated than this adage suggests. In southern Africa 
the armies of the freedom struggles emerged as ‘victors’ but this has not necessarily 
meant that the ‘vanquished’ have been altogether silenced (something attested to by 
the continuing access that SADF apologists have to the public sphere). In fact, there is 
no consensus whatsoever about Cassinga in South Africa’s collective memory. The 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission singled out Cassinga as the most controversial 
external military operation undertaken by the SADF during the period covered by its 
                                                 
25 The Star, 6 June 1996 (‘SA to Say Sorry for Celebrating Defence Force Raid’). 
26 McGill Alexander, ‘The Cassinga Raid’, p. 5. 
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brief.27 The report condemned Operation Reindeer as a violation of Angolan territorial 
integrity launched from illegally occupied Namibia and a gross violation of human 
rights. It added that the raid "violated international humanitarian law on other counts, 
one of which was the failure to take adequate steps to protect the lives of civilians". 
But all in all, the report paid relatively little attention to South Africa’s war of 
destabilisation against the frontline states. Government-commissioned histories of the 
liberation struggle and school textbooks have not paid much attention to this theatre 
of conflict either. Yet stories of the war (which occasionally include accounts of 
Cassinga) by combat veterans, retired SADF generals or military aficionados still 
appear in local publishers catalogues and on bookseller’s shelves. There appears to be 
a ready market for accounts of the ‘Border War’.28 For as long as these stories are 
able to compete with the official Namibian narrative of the war of liberation, the 
battle for Cassinga will continue. 
 
Conclusion 
Thirty years on and the battle for the meaning of Cassinga is still being waged. This 
much is evident from the exchanges in the ether, the controversy generated by 
commemorations, and the polemics of public discourse. The battle has been 
complicated by the intersections and intricacies of the political transitions in South 
Africa and its neighbouring states (especially in Namibia and Angola). Is this battle 
likely to have a winner and a loser? Will there be a clear-cut outcome in this culture 
war? Will the winner of this battle determine the manner in which the event is to be 
narrated? Will the outcome of this battle shape the rhetoric of the dominant culture? 
Kali Tel holds that if the dominant culture manages to appropriate the story and can 
codify it in its own terms, the status quo will remain unchanged.29 But this begs the 
question, what is the dominant culture in post-colonial/conflict southern Africa? Will 
an answer to this question determine whether Cassinga will be remembered as a 
massacre rather than a military operation? 
                                                 
27 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 2. p. 46, para.?  
28 I have attempted to problematise this term in my introduction to G. Baines & P. Vale (eds.), Beyond 
the Border War: New Perspectives on Southern Africa’s Late Cold War Conflicts (Pretoria: Unisa 
Press, 2008). 
29 Kalí Tal, Worlds of Hurt: Reading the Literatures of Trauma (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), pp. 7, 18-19. 
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